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Introduction 
Why is it that certain terrorist organizations employ suicide terrorism to advance their objectives, 
while others do not? In order to answer this question, I will examine why Hamas, the central 
terrorist organization operating within the Occupied Territories, has gradually escalated its 
employment of suicide terrorism; and why the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a separatist group 
operating in Turkey, gradually abandoned it as a component of its broader strategy. I will discuss 
the activities of these groups within the context of two competing explanations of suicide terrorism: 
those which focus on religious motivations, and those which focus on strategic motivations. I 
argue that while the first set of explanations is meritorious in some instances, the latter set of 
explanations is much more broadly applicable, and, as such, more legitimate. 
Suicide Terrorism as Strategy 
Hamas’ official charter, made public on August 18, 1988, articulates a harrowing commitment to 
the complete destruction of Israel: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will 
obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”[1] The charter’s most striking features lie not in 
its body, but, rather, in its opening and closing statements. The document begins “In The Name 
Of The Most Merciful Allah,” and concludes deferentially—“The last of our prayers will be praise 
to Allah, the Master of the Universe.”[2] Indeed, there is an undeniable religiosity to this document, 
one whose invocations of Islamic principles is still widely associated with Hamas and its 
supporters. It should be apparent, however, that Hamas’ charter is not reflective of the Holy 
Qu’ran, but rather is replete with egregious distortions of select statements contained therein and 
fallacious renditions of Islamic principles.  
Hamas’ ultimate objectives are, and always have been religious. Imad Saluji, once the head of 
Hamas’ political wing, argues that “Palestine [cannot be] completely free until it is an Islamic 
State.”[3] Saluji’s pronouncement is remarkably similar to other statements of Hamas’ objectives. 
While still a student at al-Azhar University in Cairo, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin—the founder of 
Hamas—came to believe that Palestine was “consecrated for future Muslim generations until 
Judgment Day.”[4] His views became decidedly more militant with the passing of time: following 
the signature of the Oslo Accords in September 1993, he condemned the peace process as a 
failed “substitute for jihad and resistance.”[5]  
Hamas’ ultimate ambition is to establish and impose an Islamic state which would encompass all 
of Palestine. However, the central tactic which Hamas has used to advance that objective —
suicide terrorism—is much more suitably attributed to pragmatic considerations than to religious 
principles. Even many noted scholars who accord religion considerable explanatory power have 
conceded this point. Consider the words of an Israeli Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem: “While the language used by the bombers and their organizations is 
always distinctly Islamic, the motives of the bombers are much more complicated, and some 
mention more than one motive for their act.”[6]  
The two central explanations of suicide terrorism which oppose mine fail to make this crucial 
distinction. The first of these explanations, simply stated, is that “people become suicide bombers 
because of religious principles.”[7] Such a posture, in addition to being overly simplistic, belies the 
reality that the leading practitioner of suicide terrorism is a secular, nationalist group in Sri Lanka, 
the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam.[8] The second, and equally prominent of these explanations 
is that perpetrators of suicide terrorism suffer from some psychological disturbance—that, in 
effect, they are “deranged.”[9] However, numerous reputable studies have firmly dispelled this 
notion.[10] Indeed, while these two explanations of suicide terrorism have different emphases, 
they both, mistakenly, ignore the geopolitical circumstances which give rise to this practice. It is 
facile to ascribe suicide bombing to irrationality: the act of martyring oneself to murder innocents 
is unconscionably gruesome and barbaric. However, as I have noted above, and continue to 
illustrate below, analyses which focus on the act of suicide terrorism alone are woefully 
insufficient.  
Hamas has employed suicide terrorism not because this tactic is grounded in Islamic principles or 
depraved psychology, but, rather, because it is one of the most strategically utilitarian forms of 
asymmetric warfare. By any reasonable measure, Israel would annihilate Hamas were the two to 
engage in conventional military warfare. With redoubtable technological prowess; anywhere 
between 100 and 200 nuclear warheads; and, now, even a submarine-based atomic arms 
capability, it is certainly the “military powerhouse of the Middle East.”[11] It is within this 
framework that Ramadan Shalah, Hamas’ secretary general, supplies the rationale for suicide 
bombing: “Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is 
trained to a very high standard…We have nothing with which to repel the killing and thuggery 
against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives…human 
bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs.”[12]  
Between April 1993 and September 2000, Hamas conducted 27 suicide attacks, resulting in 120 
of the 290 fatalities which Israel sustained at the hands of Palestinian terrorist organizations; in 
between September 2000 and November 2004, Hamas conducted 112 suicide attacks, resulting 
in 474 of the 918 fatalities which Israel sustained at the hands of Palestinian terrorist 
organizations.[13] Note that during this second, shorter time period, Hamas caused four times as 
many Israeli casualties; furthermore, the proportion of Israeli casualties of terrorism resulting from 
Hamas' attacks grew by approximately 11 percent. More broadly, developments since April 1993 
have affirmed the “coercive effectiveness” of suicide terrorism: by employing this tactic, Hamas 
compelled Israeli forces to withdraw from Gaza in 1994 and from the West Bank in 1995.[14] Ten 
years later, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s decision to unilaterally evacuate all Jewish 
residents of the Gaza Strip is seen as yet another strategic “victory for Palestinian resistance.”[15]  
It is natural to ask why Islamist terrorist groups such as Hamas have employed suicide terrorism 
more than their secular counterparts, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP). The clearest explanation is that the memberships of and bases of support for these 
groups are negligible compared to those, respectively, of and for Hamas. The PFLP, for example, 
is believed to have a static pool of approximately 800 members, whereas Hamas is known to 
have a dynamic membership which, at any one time, numbers in the tens of thousands.[16] As 
such, each member of Hamas is far more dispensable, and can be readily replaced with a willing 
recruit. Each member of PFLP is, by comparison, much more crucial to the organization’s viability, 
and, as such, far less expendable. The next logical question to ask, then, is why Hamas has this 
wider base of support. It has, more than any other Palestinian terrorist organization, helped to 
extract significant territorial concessions from Israel, thereby cementing its reputation among the 
Palestinian people as a committed, successful agent of change. Furthermore, “[Hamas] has 
created a community that has social services, schools, and healthcare, while maintaining military 
wings that carry out suicide bombings. Other Palestinian terrorist groups simply conduct violence 
without understanding or coordinating the social needs of the population they claim to defend.”[17]  
What the above analysis makes clear is that merely invoking (or perverting) Islamic principles 
could never have endeared Hamas to the Palestinian population or legitimized its practice of 
suicide bombing.  
It should be noted that the Palestinian public has not always actively supported Hamas’ practice 
of suicide bombing. Prior to Autumn 2000, Palestinian support for this practice never surpassed 
33 percent.[18] Support for suicide terrorism rose dramatically thereafter, as the peace process 
disintegrated and compounded domestic frustration: “Public opinion polls showed a steady 
increase in support for martyrdom operations as Palestinian hopes for a peaceful future 
plummeted… Violence now resonates with the larger population because of some of the Sharon 
government’s counterterror tactics.”[19] Hamas’ escalating use of suicide bombings owed not to 
religious principles, but rather to an important strategic consideration: that Palestinians are more 
likely to espouse this tactic in times of despair.  
Furthermore, suicide bombing, in addition to entailing closely related economic and strategic 
benefits for Hamas, minimizes the costs which it incurs in its armed struggle against Israel. On 
average, it only costs Hamas $150 to launch a suicide attack.[20] By contrast, the economic costs 
which Israel has sustained as a result of suicide terrorism—the most recent phases of which are 
known as the “Intifada”—have been proportionally much greater:  
The Bank of Israel estimates the damage to the Israeli economy from just one year of Intifada—
the year 2002—at 3.8% of GDP. Following its conceptual framework and assuming the Intifada 
had ended by the end of year 2000, the accumulated three-year loss is enormous: in the range of 
90 billion NIS—22 billion dollars or one-fifth of one years’ gross domestic product…The absolute 
number of poor people, since the Intifada started, increased by 22%. Today one in five Israelis is 
poor. The number of poor children rose by 30%. Almost one in three children in Israel now lives in 
a poor family.[21]  
The economic costs of suicide terrorism are compounded by equally, if not more important 
political ramifications. Some historical context is appropriate here. The motivation behind Hamas’ 
practice of suicide terrorism can be traced back to September 1972, when members of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) massacred 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. 
Intuition and basic morality would suggest that such barbarity would be met with widespread 
censure; it was, perversely enough, rewarded. In November 1972, the United Nations affirmed 
the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and granted the PLO observer status. By 
murdering Israeli athletes in such a dramatic and horrifying manner, the PLO succeeded in 
focusing widespread international attention on the plight of the Palestinian people, and in so 
doing, advanced the cause of Palestinian nationalism. In this sense, “many in [Yasir] Arafat's 
entourage regarded terror as effective and the murderous attack on the Israeli compound in 
Munich as a triumph.”[22] Today, Hamas seeks not to elicit international support for Palestinian 
nationalism, which already abounds, but rather to legitimize the view that Israel is a repressive 
state, intent on crushing the spirit of the Palestinian people. Quite often, Israel’s responses to 
suicide bombings have, rightly or wrongly, lent considerable credence to this perception. Israel’s 
incursion into the Jenin refugee camp in April 2002, and its ongoing construction of a “security 
fence” within the Occupied Territories are two of the clearer affirmations of this contention.  
The same basic conclusions which I have derived above result when one analyzes the PKK’s use 
of suicide terrorism. Here, however, the religious explanation is even more tenuous, whereas at 
least it had some ability to explain Hamas’ ultimate objectives. Indeed, there is virtually no 
mention of religious motivations in commonly cited descriptions of the PKK’s origins and activities. 
Dr. Ariel Merari, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at 
Harvard University, made the following statement on this subject: 
The Kurdish PKK, the Kurdish Labor Party, is a Marxist party. They are certainly not religious. 
And they have also carried out suicide terrorist attacks. Religiosity and religious motivation, and 
the belief in Paradise are not a must. Actually, in many cases terrorists have carried out suicide 
attacks out of nationalist motivation or in the name at least of nationalist motivation, patriotic 
motivation as they see it, or any other motivating force that is non-religious.[23] 
The Economist affirmed this notion in a recent editorial: “The Kurdish PKK, which has deployed 
suicide bombers in its quests for Kurdish autonomy and for the release of its captured leader, 
Abdullah Ocalan, is influenced less by Islam than by Marxist-Leninism.”[ 24] One could reasonably 
argue that these appraisals of the PKK’s character are understated, because the PKK is not 
accurately described as insouciant towards Islam, but rather, as opposed to it: one study notes its 
fervently “antireligious rhetoric and violence.”[25]  
The fledging organization garnered increasing popular support after a right-wing military junta 
seized power on September 12, 1980. The new government, led by General Kenan Evren, 
abolished Turkey’s existing constitution, sanctioned the torture of political detainees, and, more 
broadly, adopted a series of repressive measures which entrenched its autocracy.[26] In light of 
this abrupt departure from quasi-democratic rule to near authoritarian governance, the PKK 
gained widespread legitimacy and crucial indigenous support: indeed, it was this broad base of 
domestic support that, in large part, allowed the PKK to finance a sophisticated, multifaceted 
insurgency against the Turkish government:  
From 1984 the PKK became a force to be reckoned with, a genuine guerrilla movement 
significantly supported by ordinary Kurdish peasants. What began as a nuisance to the Turkish 
state grew over the 1980s into a large-scale civil war. By 1990, some 300,000 troops were 
deployed in the southeast and an enormous amount of the national budget (with reports ranging 
from 25 to 40 percent) was going to support police and military operations there. In 1992, the 
government began a policy of forcibly evacuating villages in order to deprive the PKK of its 
popular support.[27] 
The PKK’s decision to adopt suicide terrorism came during 1996, as the Turkish government 
bolstered its possession of conventional armaments and significantly weakened the organization. 
That year, Turkey initiated a massive, $31 billion program to modernize its military over the 
course of the next eight years, beginning with a purchase of 145 Cobra attack helicopters.[28] 
The following year, it concluded a ten-week siege of PKK sanctuaries, known as “Operation 
Hammer,” not only killing close to 3,000 of its operatives, but also, in the process, destroying 
much of its economic infrastructure. Setbacks such as these “had an adverse effect on the 
morale of its members…the organization was seeking an effective means to reverse this trend 
and to boost the morale of its fighters. Suicide missions were therefore chosen as a consolidating 
tool.”[29] More broadly, the PKK adopted suicide terrorism because it believed that such an 
anomalistic practice would compel Turkey to grant autonomy to its Kurdish inhabitants.[30]  
The PKK only carried out a total of 21 suicide attacks, but, given the opportunity, would likely 
have carried out more. Indeed, during a 1997 interview, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, 
cited suicide terrorism as an integral component of the organization’s strategy.[31] Why then, did 
it abandon suicide terrorism after carrying out a comparatively small number of attacks? Turkey 
launched aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns, many of which were far more destructive and 
pitiless than Israel’s, and both Turkish and Israeli government operations resulted in considerable 
civilian casualties. However, unlike Israel’s, Turkey’s counterterrorism operations dually targeted 
PKK militants and provided assistance to innocent civilians enmeshed in the crossfire: 
…the Turkish military hit the rebels hard, crushing the PKK, closing down international support for 
them and eventually arresting its leader. But the Army directed its fire at the rebels and not the 
surrounding population. In fact, the Turks worked very hard to win over the Kurds, creating stable 
governing structures for them, befriending them and putting forward social-welfare programs—to 
improve agriculture and women's education, for example. The Turkish government made a 
massive investment (totaling well over $32 billion) in the Kurdish southeast. On a per capita basis, 
it has invested more in the Kurdish region than in any other part of Turkey.[32]  
Indeed, the PKK was forced to give up suicide terrorism as a tactic of warfare against the Turkish 
government, in large measure because the very individuals upon whom it crucially relied for 
support—Turkish Kurds—“repudiated suicide terror when it was used by the PKK in 1996.”[33]  
In juxtaposing Hamas’ expanded use of suicide terrorism with the PKK’s eventual abandonment 
of this tactic, it becomes clear that the motivations behind employing it are based far more on 
strategic considerations than religious tactics. Those individuals who perpetrate suicide terrorism 
are not necessarily religious fanatics or depraved neurotics, as is commonly believed, but are, 
rather, pragmatic strategists. Reasonable individuals may very well disagree on just how 
governments such as those in Iraq and Israel should defeat this resurgent phenomenon. There is 
little doubt, however, that to brand suicide bombers as religious fanatics, among other convenient 
labels, is to condemn any such strategy to failure. 
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